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Risk disclosure causation and the role 
of Chester 
Michelle Robson and Kristina Swift* 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the scope and application of Chester v Afshar1 following 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board 2 and more recent decisions that have 
followed Montgomery.  It will attempt to address residual confusion concerning the 
impact of the decision in Chester and argue that inappropriate recourse to Chester is 
the source of much of the confusion surrounding causation and risk disclosure. 
Following the recent decisions in Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust 
and Diamond v Royal Devon & Exeter NHSFT3 this article argues that far from being 
an exceptional case Chester is a very ordinary case and not the special solution to 
tricky causation problems.   
 
Introduction: Chester, Montgomery and Duce 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board is now recognised as a landmark case, a 
decision which heralded a long overdue development in the law; the recognition of 
patient autonomy and the end of the much maligned ‘doctors know best’4 approach 
to information disclosure. Academics have largely focussed on the breach of duty 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturers in Law, members of the Medical and Mental Health Law Research Interest Group (MELRIG), 
School of Law, University of Northumbria. 
1 [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] AC 134. 
2 [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] AC 1430. 
3 [2018] EWCA Civ 1307; [2019] EWCA Civ 585. 
4 The term used to describe a paternalistic attitude of clinicians to information disclosure. Pre-Montgomery 
clinicians would decide what information they provide to patients. Post-Montgomery information disclosure takes 
its lead from what a reasonable patient would want to know. 
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aspect of the decision;5 the demise of the Bolam6 test and the acceptance of the 
patient-driven standard espoused by Montgomery and its predecessors before it.7 
However, as with all claims in negligence, breach of duty is only one hurdle the 
claimant must overcome. Once established that the risk should have been disclosed, 
the claimant must then prove on a balance of probabilities that the absence of 
disclosure of the risk caused the injury complained of. The causation issue in 
Montgomery was similarly determined. Given the seriousness of the risk involved, 
that if she had known of the risks associated with natural delivery she would have 
elected to have a caesarean section,8 causation was established on a factual 
causation9 basis. Unusually, the Supreme Court preferred the evidence of Nadine 
Montgomery’s consultant obstetrician, Dr McLellan, to Nadine Montgomery’s own 
testimony in reaching this conclusion. Relying on the Lord Ordinary’s previous 
assessment that Dr McLellan’s evidence was both ‘credible and reliable’ the 
Supreme Court were convinced that Nadine Montgomery would have elected for a 
caesarean section.10 Therefore this rendered it unnecessary ‘to consider whether if, 
Mrs. Montgomery could not establish ‘but for’ causation, she might nevertheless 
establish causation on some other basis in the light of Chester v Afshar’.11 With this 
obiter comment, the Supreme Court seemingly acknowledged the existence of a 
                                                          
5 See R Heywood ‘R.I.P. Sidaway: Patient-Oriented Disclosure – A Standard Worth Waiting For? Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11’ [2015] 23 Med L Rev 455; J Laing ‘Delivering informed consent post-
Montgomery: implications for medical practice and professionalism’ (2017) PN 33(2) 128; C Foster "The last word 
on consent?' (2 April 2015) NLJ.  
6 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; [1957] 2 All ER 118. In Bolam, McNair J 
gave the most cited direction to a jury at [122], a doctor was ‘not guilty of negligence if he has acted in 
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art.’ 
Thus the amount of information to be disclosed to the patient was to be judged in accordance with medical 
accepted practice, effectively allowing the medical profession to decide what risks (if any) to disclose to the 
patient. Critics of the Bolam test (see for example A Maclean, ‘From Sidaway to Pearce and beyond: is the legal 
regulation of consent any better following a quarter of a century of judicial scrutiny?’ [2012] Med L Rev 20(1) 108) 
argued that risk disclosure merited a different approach from claims for negligent diagnosis or treatment, as risk 
disclosure involves no clinical skill. 
7 See for example Lord Scarman’s dissenting judgment in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital [1985] AC 871 at p 882; Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 343; Rogers v 
Whitaker [1992] 11 WLUK 288; [1993] 4 Med LR 79. 
8 Supra n 2 at [18]. 
9 First limb of test for causation referred to as the ‘but for’ test and discussed further below. 
10 Supra n 2 at [104]. The Supreme Court held that the Lord Ordinary and the Extra Division had failed to 
consider Dr McClellan’s evidence in considering factual causation and had erroneously relied exclusively on 
Nadine Montgomery’s evidence which they had subsequently determined as inherently unreliable and affected by 
hindsight.  The Supreme Court noted that the Lord Ordinary ‘had no such misgivings about Dr McLellan: she was 
found to be “an impressive witness” in relation to the informed consent aspect of the case, and her evidence was 
“credible and reliable.”  Relying on Dr McClellan’s evidence that if Nadine Montgomery had been made aware of 
the risk ‘she would have no doubt requested a caesarean section, as would any diabetic today” (para 100) the 
Supreme Court concluded factual causation was established. 
11 Supra n 2 at [105]. This approach contrasts with that taken by the Court of Session which after finding the but 
for test not satisfied then considered causation afresh applying Chester v Afshar, see Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board  [2010] CSOH 104, at 268. 
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potential alternative to the ‘but for test’,12 the much-maligned ‘Chester exception’13 
however they failed to give an insight as to how and when the Chester exception 
may be invoked, which is perhaps understandable given the application of the 
orthodox approach. The purpose of this article is to re-visit the decision of Chester v 
Afshar, labelled by many a doctrinal anomaly,14 a blot on the causation landscape, 
but more recently making a comeback in a flurry of post- Montgomery decisions.15 
We will begin our discussion by providing a brief overview of the law of factual 
causation, before then moving on to consider causation in the context of a negligent 
failure to warn. An analysis of the case of Chester and a review of the role of Chester 
in the post-Montgomery jurisprudence will follow. Finally, we will address the residual 
uncertainties surrounding the scope and applicability of the Chester exception. The 
decisions in Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust and Diamond v 
Royal Devon & Exeter NHSFT 16 will be instrumental in our conclusion that Chester 
is not after all an exception or even a viable alternative when the conventional route 
for proving factual causation fails, but it remains of potential significance for legal 
causation. 
Causation – the legal tests 
Having established breach of the duty of care the claimant must then establish 
causation which can be divided as follows: 
 Stage 1 Factual causation: the ‘but for’ test– the claimant must establish the 
damage suffered would not have arisen but for the defendant’s breach of 
duty; and 
 Stage 2 Legal Causation: the scope of liability – at the very least the damage 
to the claimant must have been foreseeable and it also must not be merely 
coincidental. 
 
                                                          
12 The test for factual causation discussed below 
13 Supra n 1. Chester has been considered as an alternative to the conventional causation test. 
14 See for example, S Green ‘Chester v Afshar [2004]’ in Herring and Wall (eds) ‘Landmark Cases in Medical 
Law’ (Hart Publishing, 2015); T Clark and  D Nolan ‘A Critique of Chester v Afshar’ (2014) 34(4) OJLS 659; C 
Foster ‘It should be, therefore it is’ (2004) 154 NLJ 1644. 
15 Supra n 3. See also See Shaw v Kovac and University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 
1028; Correia v University Hospital of North Staffordshire NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 356; Jones v Royal Devon 
& Exeter NHSFT (unreported; judgment handed down 22/9/2015). 
16 Supra n 3. 
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Causation is a difficult concept and there is a lack of consensus in relation to how the 
different elements of causation should be divided.17   In relation to factual causation 
the but for test is the appropriate starting point. Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington 
Hospital Management Committee 18 confirms the nature of this test.  In Barnett, the 
claimant attended hospital following an episode of vomiting.  The doctor on duty did 
not see the patient but advised a nurse to tell the patient he should go home to rest. 
He died a few hours later from arsenic poisoning.  An action in negligence against 
the hospital failed on the basis that by the time the claimant reached hospital, the 
arsenic poisoning was so far advanced that death would still have occurred even if 
treatment had been given. The defendant causes a claimant’s injury if the injury 
would not have happened but for the defendant’s breach of duty. The claimant must 
establish the causal connection between the breach and the loss sustained on the 
balance of probabilities, such that it is more likely than not that the breach of duty is 
a but for cause.  The but for test does not always provide a solution to a complex 
scenario where for instance there are multiple factors at play or where there is an 
evidentiary gap.19 Arguably, Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd and others20 
is the most recognised example of a policy decision in the context of factual 
causation. The claimants developed mesothelioma as a direct consequence of 
asbestos exposure but had worked for various employers and the medical evidence 
was equivocal as to which period of exposure led to the injury.21 The claimants 
succeeded on the basis that each period of exposure materially increased the risk of 
developing mesothelioma.22 
However, the issues that arise in relation to risk disclosure do not fall into this 
‘complex’ category of cases involving scientific uncertainty.  In a risk disclosure case 
                                                          
17J Stapleton ‘Occam’s razor reveals an orthodox basis for Chester v Afshar’ (2006) L.Q.R 426, 426. Stapleton 
considers the three- step approach advocated by Hart and Honore (in Causation in the Law (OUP, 1985) to be 
‘both inconvenient and obfuscatory’.  She advocates focus on ‘a two-step analysis consisting of the factual issue 
of historical involvement and the normative question of whether a particular consequence of breach should be 
judged to be within the scope of liability for the breach.’ 
18 [1969] 1 QB 428. 
19 See Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613, McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 and 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002] UKHL 22 instances where there was an evidentiary gap. 
20 [2002] UKHL 22. 
21 Mesothelioma is triggered by a single incident of exposure and by the inhalation or ingestion of a single fibre. 
22 Supra n 20. Lord Bingham observed at [33], ‘there is a strong policy argument in favour of compensating those 
who have suffered grave harm, at the expense of their employers who owed them a duty to protect them against 
that very harm and failed to do so, when the harm can only have been caused by breach of that duty and when 
science does not permit the victim accurately to attribute, as between several employers, the precise 
responsibility for the harm.’  
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attention is focused on the effect of non-disclosure of risk or failure to discuss 
alternative treatments and the but for test is applied to determine this.  
Even if the but for test is satisfied, further analysis is needed to determine whether 
the connection is sufficient to establish legal causation and whether the damage 
caused is within the scope of the defendant’s liability.  At this stage of the causation 
analysis, the enquiry is whether the defendant should be liable for the claimant’s 
injury.  Initially we consider whether the harm is of a foreseeable type23 but even if it 
is, the enquiry does not end there as a defendant will not necessarily be liable for all 
foreseeable harm.  In terms of scope of liability this will be limited ‘to those 
consequences which are attributable to that which made the act wrongful’.24 Clark 
and Nolan argue that ‘what makes the defendant’s act wrongful is the fact that it 
creates unreasonable risks,…and liability is imposed only where the consequence in 
question was the materialisation of one of the risks that made the defendant’s 
conduct wrongful in the first place’.25 An outcome that is merely coincidental would 
not be sufficient to attract liability.  Although, as argued by Turton, it is difficult to 
identify what will constitute a coincidental outcome to negate liability and there is a 
lack of clarity as to what is meant by ‘coincidence’.26 This stage of the causation 
enquiry has an inherent policy dimension as a decision must be taken as to how far 
liability should extend.27 
We will now consider causation in the context of a failure to warn.  
Causation: the special case of failure to warn 
Usually in a risk disclosure claim the focus is exclusively on factual causation, the 
courts formulating the question as to what would a person in the claimant’s position 
have done had the risk been disclosed; put simply a ‘would they or wouldn’t they’ 
approach. In this jurisdiction the courts have adopted a subjective test for causation, 
what would the claimant herself have chosen to do had the risk been disclosed, the 
                                                          
23 Test for remoteness of damage as set out in The Wagon Mound Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller 
Steamship Pty Ltd [1966] 2 All ER 709, [1967] 1 AC 617 
24 South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague [1997] AC191 (commonly known as ‘SAAMCO’)  
25 T Clark and D Nolan, ‘A Critique of Chester v Afshar’ (2014) 34(4) OJLS 659, 664 
26 See G Turton ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment Post-Montgomery: Causation and Coincidence’ (2018) 
Med L Rev  27(1) 108, 121. Turton argues ‘inconsistency in the use of the notion of coincidence is accompanied 
in general by a failure to define what is meant by the term ‘coincidence.’ 
27 Supra n 17, at  437 Stapleton notes ‘the normative concerns that influence courts’ decisions on scope 
are…ones on which reasonable minds might differ for a variety of moral as well as policy reasons.’ 
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particular patient test.28 This contrasts with an objective test that asks what a 
reasonable patient in the claimant’s position would have done, an approach favoured 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in an attempt to counteract the risk of self-serving 
evidence from patients giving evidence with the benefit of hindsight.29 The objective 
test can be criticised for its failure to consider the individual patient, for if the success 
of the claimant action is wholly dependent on what a reasonable patient would have 
done this precludes a claimant refusing treatment for reasons that are considered 
irrational or for no reason at all. In Smith v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Health 
Authority the defendant failed to disclose to the claimant the risk that she would be 
immediately and permanently tetraplegic following an operation on her spinal cord.30 
Finding the defendant to have breached their duty in failing to inform the claimant of 
the risk, the court then addressed what was correct approach to the issue of factual 
causation.31 Hutchinson J stated the question was whether this particular patient if 
she had been made aware of the risk would have decided to undergo the operation. 
He favoured a subjective test but elected to evaluate the evidence on an objective 
basis, contending that everything pointed to the claimant acting as a reasonable 
patient and consenting to the operation if she had been properly informed.32 
Hutchinson J observed that there was a danger in considering the evidence of the 
claimant given in the witness box ‘in a wholly artificial situation’.33 Only if there were 
additional factors to substantiate the claimant’s position,34 would the court accept 
that the claimant had good reason for not following the reasonable patient 
approach.35 In Smith Hutchinson J found nothing to differentiate the claimant from 
the ordinary reasonable patient. The claimant’s own assertion that she would have 
refused the surgery in the knowledge that the success of her case depended on it 
therefore carried very little weight. 
                                                          
28 Although in Hills v Potter [1984] 1 WLR 641 Hirst J held that the claimant’s action failed whether the test was 
objective or subjective. 
29 See for example Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR. (3d) 1; [1980] 2 SCR 880 
30 [1994] 5 Med LR 285. The claimant when aged nine, had undergone a successful operation to drain a cyst on 
her spinal cord but some nine years later she began to experience symptoms of paralysis and was advised by 
her surgeon, Mr Fairburn (who died before the trial) to have further surgery in an attempt to alleviate her 
symptoms. Mr Fairburn however failed to inform the claimant that (1) if nothing was done she was likely to be 
tetraplegic within nine months; and (2) that if the operation was performed this may delay the onset of paralysis 
for some years but there was a “real risk” that the paralysis would be immediate.  
31 Ibid at [298]. 
32  Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. Hutchinson J gives examples of religious convictions or particular social or domestic considerations. 
35 Supra  n 29 
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In a ‘what if’ situation in a risk disclosure case factual causation may be more 
speculative as the claimant is unlikely to have a track record of provable statements 
about what they would do had they been in possession of all the facts. However, 
whether the factual causation test is subjective or objective, the courts will test the 
credibility of the claimant’s evidence, and if the hypothetical reasonable patient 
would have accepted the treatment then this may cast doubt on a claimant who 
maintains they would have acted differently. In Smith, it was likely that the claimant 
would have run the risk knowing that it was her only hope of avoiding an inevitable 
paralysis, other situations however may not be as clear-cut.  
Smith’s importance is perhaps now only as an illustration of the court’s approach to 
factual causation pre-Montgomery jurisprudence. Any dispute regarding causation 
was at the factual causation stage, disputes regarding legal causation did not arise. 
That is until the decision in Chester v Afshar. 
  
Chester v Afshar:  a causation solution for a special causation 
problem 
Carole Chester suffered recurrent back pain for a number of years and had tried a 
number of treatments with mixed success.  As a last resort, she agreed to elective 
back surgery. The surgery was performed without negligence but the claimant 
succumbed to an inherent risk in the surgery, a 1-2% risk of cauda equina syndrome, 
leaving her partially paralysed. Mr Afshar was found to have breached his duty of care 
by failing to warn her of the risk. However, Carole Chester then presented a causation 
dilemma. Her argument was not: 
(i) that had she been warned of the risk she would never have had the operation; 
or 
(ii) that she would have searched for another surgeon to perform the operation (so 
creating a different set of circumstances36) 
                                                          
36 In Chester all of their Lordships (with the exception of Lord Hoffman) referred to the Australian case of Chappel 
v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232; [1998] 9 WLUK 26. Chappel is factually similar to Chester – Mrs Hart’s surgery was 
elective (in this instance on the oesophagus) and was performed competently. Like Carole Chester, Mrs Hart 
succumbed to an inherent risk in the operation resulting in paralysis (in Mrs Hart’s case the paralysis was to her 
vocal chord). However, unlike Carole Chester, Mrs Hart alleged that had she been informed of the risk, she would 
have delayed her operation in order to research and locate the most experienced surgeon to perform the 
procedure, thus creating a different set of circumstances and arguably reducing the risk of injury. By a majority, 
the High Court found for Mrs Hart on conventional causation principles.  Carole Chester however could not rely 
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Carole Chester argued if she had known of the risk of cauda equina syndrome she 
would not have undergone the surgery within three days of her first consultation, she 
instead would have sought advice on the alternatives. There was no finding that Carole 
Chester would never have had the operation had she been made aware of the risk of 
cauda equina syndrome.37 
 
In the House of Lords, the majority found the test for factual causation satisfied, Carole 
Chester would not have suffered her injury but for the defendant’s breach of duty. Lord 
Steyn commented, ‘-…it is a distinctive feature of the present case that but for the 
surgeon’s negligent failure to warn the claimant of the small of risk serious injury the 
actual injury would not have occurred when it did and the chances of it occurring on a 
subsequent occasion were very small’.38 Lord Hope asserted ‘The “but for” test is 
easily satisfied…..she would not have had the operation on 21 November 1994 if the 
warning had been given’.39 Lord Walker, agreeing with the judgments of both Lord 
Steyn and Lord Hope, found ‘Bare “but for” causation was powerfully reinforced by the 
fact that the misfortune which befell the claimant was the very misfortune which was 
the focus of the surgeon’s duty to warn’.40  The fact that the injury sustained by Carole 
Chester was the very risk of injury Mr Afshar was under a duty to warn her of, was 
also reason to find the ‘but for’ test satisfied.  
 
The dissenting judgments adopted a different view and found the claimant had not 
satisfied the test for factual causation. Lord Hoffman stated bluntly, the burden is on 
                                                          
on a similar argument, there was no indication she would have sought a different surgeon and she could not 
definitively say what course of action she would have followed had she been aware of the risk.  
37 Supra n 1 at [7]. 
38 Ibid at [19]. 
39 Ibid at [81]. 
40 Ibid at [94]. In his deliberations on factual causation Lord Walker considered it important that Carole Chester 
had sustained the very injury which Mr Afshar had neglected to warn her of and not some ‘wholly unforeseeable 
accident of anaesthesia’ or an injury that could be ‘described as coincidental.’ He referred to the example of 
passenger of a speeding taxi cab who was injured when a falling tree hit the cab. Lord Walker opined that this 
was an example of ‘sheer coincidence.’ Whether Miss Chester’s injury is labelled as a coincidence appears 
wholly dependent on whether we consider the risk would have been the same whenever she had the operation a 
point on which the House of Lords took very differing views. For further discussion on the concept of coincidence 
see supra  n 26,  G Turton, ‘Informed Consent to Medical Treatment Post-Montgomery: Causation and 
Coincidence’ (2018) Med Law Rev  27(1) 108. 
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the claimant to prove that she would never have underwent the operation.41 Dismissing 
the claimant’s case that she need only prove she would not have had the operation on 
that day, Lord Hoffmann responded that the question was, ’whether one would have 
taken the opportunity to avoid or reduce the risk, not whether one would have changed 
the scenario in some irrelevant detail’.42 Lord Bingham agreed that the but for test was 
not satisfied as ‘Miss Chester has not established that but for the failure to warn she 
would not have undergone the surgery’.43 Carole Chester had proven that she would 
not have consented to the surgery when she did if she had been aware of the risk. 
However, Lord Bingham opined the timing of the operation was irrelevant to the injury 
she suffered. 44 
 
Although perhaps some of the arguments of the minority are persuasive, as Miss 
Chester had failed to establish that she would never have had the operation and thus 
she could be exposed to the risk of injury at a later date,45 in reality Chester is simply 
a very ordinary application of but for causation. But for the non-disclosure of risk Miss 
Chester would not have had the operation on that day. The court accepted that had 
Carole Chester been informed of the risk she would not have had the surgery at that 
time; she would have taken further advice. Whether the risk would have materialised 
on a different day is an entirely different question and it should not detract from 
acknowledging that Carole Chester’s injury was intrinsically linked to the failure of Mr 
Afshar to disclose the risk. The risk of cauda equina syndrome occurring was in the 
region of 1-2%, this made it extremely unlikely that the risk would also have occurred 
on a different day if the risk was as random as spinning a roulette wheel as Lord 
Hoffman contended.46 Mr Afshar was not to blame for the cauda equina syndrome, 
the operation was performed with reasonable care and skill, but he was at fault for 
                                                          
41 Ibid at [29]. 
42 Ibid at [31]. 
43 Ibid at [8]. 
44  Ibid at [9] per Lord Bingham, ‘But the timing of the operation is irrelevant to the injury she suffered, for which 
she claims to be compensated. That injury would have been as liable to occur whenever the surgery was 
performed and whoever performed it.’ 
45 See M Hogg ‘Duties of Care, Causation, and the Implications of Chester v Afshar’ (2005) 9 Edin L Rev 156, 
163 who also contends that, ‘None of the classic common law formulations of factual causation (whether but for, 
material contribution, or material increase in risk) give us a satisfactory answer in this [Chester] case.’ (163). For 
a different view see T Clark and D Nolan ‘A Critique of Chester v Afshar’ (2014) OJLS 34(4) 659 and J O’Sullivan 
‘Causation and non-disclosure of medical risks – reflections on Chester v Afshar’ (2003) PN 19(2) 370. 
46 Following up Lord Hoffman’s roulette analogy T Clark and D Nolan ibid, at 662 comment on the likelihood of 
the risk of cauda equina syndrome occurring on a different day and observe that, ‘the fact that a six comes up 
when you throw a die does not make it any more likely that you would have thrown a six had you waited and 
thrown the die later on.’ 
10 
  
Carole Chester being on the operating table three days after her consultation. 47  
 
The court then entered uncharted territory in a risk disclosure case and had to address 
the test for legal causation. It is worth reiterating that in a risk disclosure claim once 
factual causation is established the court must then be satisfied that the risk that 
materialised would have been avoided in the absence of the defendant’s breach of 
duty. Carole Chester presented a unique problem. She could not unequivocally state 
that she would never have undergone the operation and consequently avoided the 
risk. Lord Bingham who had previously found the test for factual causation not met,48 
opined to find for a claimant who had not established that the defendant’s breach had 
caused her any injury would be a step too far and would be substantial and unjustified 
departure from sound and established principle.49 Lord Hoffmann contended Carole 
Chester had failed to prove the non-disclosure had caused her any loss, she would 
have been exposed to precisely the same risk in any event albeit on a different day.50 
In short, the minority in Chester maintained that Miss Chester’s risk of injury was 
unaffected by the negligent non-disclosure.  
 
The minority then considered if Miss Chester might still be entitled to compensation 
even though she had, in their view, failed to prove the non-disclosure was a cause of 
her loss. Lord Bingham acknowledged that Carole Chester’s right to be informed had 
been violated but contended that this alone was insufficient reason to award damages 
when ‘violation of that right is not shown to have worsened the physical condition of 
the claimant.’51 For Lord Bingham there could be no compensation for ‘damage not 
caused by the negligence complained of.’ 52Lord Hoffmann emphasised that the 
claimant had failed to prove the non-disclosure had caused her any loss and then, like 
Lord Bingham speculated if a ‘special rule should be created by which doctors who fail 
to warn patients of risks should be made insurers against those risks’.53 Such an award 
may be appropriate to ‘vindicate a violation of a patient’s right to choose’.54 However, 
                                                          
47 [2002] EWCA Civ 724, at 44. As Sir Denis Henry observed Miss Chester’s injury was a, ‘consequence about 
which the claimant had expressed her concern to the doctor and had been wrongly reassured.’ 
48 Supra n 1 at [8]. 
49 Ibid at [9]. 
50 Ibid at [31]. 
51 Ibid at [9]. 
52 Ibid  
53 Ibid at [32]. 
54 Ibid at [33]. 
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he surmised the difficulties in calculating a figure together with the costs of litigation 
precluded a conventional award.55 Lord Hoffmann was also unmoved by any moral 
argument of making a doctor an insurer of the risk.56  
 
The majority having already found factual causation established were not so reticent 
in seeking a solution to a case that could not neatly be accommodated within 
conventional legal causation principles.  Lord Steyn argued that, ‘A narrow and modest  
departure from traditional causation principles’ was justified and that as ‘a result of the 
surgeon's failure to warn the patient, she cannot be said to have given informed 
consent to the surgery in the full legal sense’.57 Lord Hope boldly declared that ‘justice 
requires Miss Chester be afforded the remedy she seeks as the injury which she 
suffered at the hands of Mr Afshar was within the scope of the very risk which he 
should have warned her about’.58  Lord Walker emphasised the significance of the 
duty breached before he concluded Carole Chester ‘ought not to be without a remedy, 
even if it involves some extension of existing principle….Otherwise the surgeon’s 
important duty would in many cases be drained of its content’.59 The majority were in 
unison that the violation of Carole Chester’s dignity and autonomy was a wrong that 
the law should compensate. To follow conventional causation principles would, in the 
words of Lord Hope, ‘discriminate against those who cannot honestly say that they 
would have declined the operation once and for all if they had been warned.’ Such a 
result would, in Lord Hope’s view, be ‘unacceptable’. 60Lords Steyn and Walker were 
similarly minded.61 
 
The rights and wrongs of this decision have attracted intense academic scrutiny62. 
Much of the debate has centred on whether Chester offered a solution or even an 
alternative to difficulties with the conventional approach to legal causation.  Carole 
                                                          
55 Ibid at [34]. 
56 Ibid  at [35]. 
57 Ibid  at [24]. 
58 Ibid at [88]. 
59 Ibid at [101]. 
60 Ibid at [87]. 
61 Ibid.  Lord Steyn at [24] commented ‘Her right of autonomy and dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a 
narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles’. At  [101] Lord Walker stated, ‘I agree with 
Lord Steyn and Lord Hope that such a claimant ought not to be without a remedy, even if it involves some 
extension of existing principle, as in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 (see especially 
the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Bingham of Cornhill at paras 8–13). Otherwise the surgeon's 
important duty would in many cases be drained of its content.’ 
62 Supra n 14. See also J Stapleton, supra n 17. 
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Chester established that but for the non-disclosure she would not have been operated 
on that day (factual causation) but she agreed that she may have exposed herself to 
the risk of cauda equina syndrome at a later date. 63 This posed a problem for the 
conventional legal causation test where recovery is permitted only if the risk that 
materialised was increased by the defendant’s breach of duty. Carole Chester may 
still have been exposed to the same risk in any event. Clark and Nolan commenting 
on legal causation and risk disclosure argue what makes the non-disclosure negligent 
‘is not the risk of the complication in question coming about per se, but the risk of the 
complication in question coming about when the patient was unwilling to subject 
herself to that risk.’ 64 However, as Clark and Nolan point out this argument was not 
open to Miss Chester.65 Carole Chester was willing to run the risk, her complaint was 
that she had been denied an opportunity to delay it.  
 
Stauch argues that the belief that Chester involved a special departure from the 
ordinary rules of causation was the direct consequence of the failure of the House of 
Lords to always clearly distinguish between factual and legal causation.66 Had their 
Lordships been more scrupulous in differentiating between factual and legal causation, 
Stauch concludes that ‘it would have been clearer that no radically new principle was 
involved. There was merely a modest (and justifiable) relaxation of legal causation.’ 67  
 
Chester v Afshar: the aftermath 
The immediate aftermath after Chester is marked by the courts’ misunderstanding of 
Chester and a characterisation of Chester as, at best, an unusual policy decision.  
The mood of the courts is summed up by Lady Justice Arden in White v Paul 
Davidson & Taylor  who emphasised that Chester did not establish a general 
causation rule: 68 
‘I would like to add a few observations on Mr White’s supplementary written 
submissions in which he places reliance on the recent decision of the House of 
                                                          
63 Supra  n 1 at  [7]. 
64 Supra n 25 at 666-667. 
65 In support of their analysis Clark and Nolan rely on the decision of the High Court of Australia in Wallace v 
Kam [2013] HCA 19. See further n 127. 
66 M Stauch and K Wheat, Text, Cases and Materials on Medical Law (Routledge, 2018) 137. See also M 
Stauch, ‘Causation and confusion in respect of medical non-disclosure: Chester v Afshar ‘ (2005) 14 Nott LJ 66. 
67 Ibid. 
68 [2005] PNLR 15, [2004] EWCA 1511, at [40]. 
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Lords in Chester v Afshar [2004] WLR 927. In my judgment, this case does not 
establish a general rule in causation. It is an application of the principle established 
in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2003] 1 AC 32 that, in exceptional 
circumstances, rules as to causation may be modified on policy grounds.’ 
Chester’s impact seemed restricted to risk disclosure causation disputes. It was the 
flagship of patient autonomy, Montgomery, that suggested causation and Chester 
were not over and done with quite yet. 
Nadine Montgomery was diabetic, of small stature and pregnant with a large baby. 
During the course of the delivery of her baby, shoulder dystocia69 occurred and her 
son was born with severe disabilities. She maintained that the defendant acted 
negligently in failing to inform her of a 9-10% risk of shoulder dystocia associated with 
a vaginal birth and had she been made aware of the risk she would have opted for a 
caesarean section. The Supreme Court handed down a judgment that effectively 
brought the law into line with professional and ethical guidance70 explicitly ruling that 
a doctor’s duty is to ensure that a patient is aware of any material risks involved in the 
treatment and of any alternative or variant treatment. Lords Kerr and Reed 
pronounced: 
 
‘The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the 
risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would 
be likely to attach significance to it.”71 
Montgomery signaled the death knell for doctors know best72 and the Bolam73 era for 
the legal standard for disclosure. Was the Montgomery decision equally as 
momentous for causation? Adopting the accepted two-stage approach to causation, 
although expressing doubts as to whether Nadine Montgomery’s evidence was 
‘affected by hindsight’ 74 the court had no such reservations about the evidence of Dr 
                                                          
69 Shoulder dystocia is a complication that occurs during vaginal delivery when a baby’s shoulders are impacted 
in the mother's pelvis, often because the baby is too big to pass through the birth canal 
70 See GMC Guidance, Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together (2008), paras 28-36 
71 Supra n 2 at [87]. 
72 Supra n 4. 
73 Supra n 6. 
74 Supra n 2 at [104]. 
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McLellan, Nadine Montgomery’s consultant. She was unequivocal that Mrs 
Montgomery would have elected to have a caesarean section if advised of the risk of 
shoulder dystocia associated with a vaginal delivery.75 There was therefore no need 
to consider legal causation, the injury was clearly within the scope of liability. In 
Montgomery both factual and legal causation were uncontentious therefore it is 
unclear why Lords Kerr and Reid then added,” ‘It is unnecessary in these 
circumstances to consider whether if, Mrs. Montgomery could not establish “but for” 
causation, she might nevertheless establish causation on some other basis in the light 
of Chester v Afshar.’ 76 
This comment suggested the application of the Chester exception as an alternative 
to factual causation. This is, with respect, an incorrect understanding of the role of 
Chester.  In Chester the claimant succeeded on factual causation using ordinary 
principles. The reality is if Nadine Montgomery could not establish factual causation 
with reference to the but for test she would have failed. Chester could not have been 
invoked as a special solution to a factual causation problem.  If a Chester ‘exception’ 
exists, this applies to the legal causation stage, but the claimant must first survive 
the factual causation filter.77 In Montgomery once factual causation was established, 
legal causation would inevitably follow without recourse to a policy-based analysis or 
a special Chester-style solution because it was simply not required. The reference to 
Chester was misplaced, on the facts and the law.  
Chester and Montgomery involved two very different risks, two very different 
scenarios and only Chester presented with a causation problem. Carole Chester was 
not informed of a 1-2% risk with her spinal surgery. This risk was inherent; it could 
not be avoided unless Carole Chester had decided not to undergo the operation at 
all. Carole Chester’s surgery was elective, she had a choice whether to proceed with 
surgery, the failure to warn her of the risk deprived her of the opportunity to think 
things over, the ability to make a different choice, a violation of her right to autonomy. 
Had Carole Chester been made aware of the risk she would not have consented to 
the operation on that day (factual causation established) but she may have exposed 
herself to the same risk at a late date (posing a potential problem regarding the 
                                                          
75 Ibid. See also the judgment of Lady Justice Hale who observed at [113], “What could be the benefits of vaginal 
delivery which would outweigh avoiding the risks to both mother and child.”  
76 Ibid  at 105 
77 Supra n 1, at [19], [81] and [94]. In Chester the majority all found the factual causation test satisfied.  
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scope of liability). Nadine Montgomery was not warned of a 9-10% risk of injury to 
her unborn son if she proceeded with a vaginal delivery. Nadine Montgomery could 
have avoided the risk by opting for a caesarean section. Unlike Carole Chester, 
Nadine Montgomery had no choice but to expose herself to the risk of injury to 
herself and her unborn son, the delivery of her baby was inevitable. The failure to 
disclose the risk of shoulder dystocia deprived Nadine Montgomery of the 
opportunity to reduce the risk to her unborn child. If Nadine Montgomery had been 
made aware of the risk with a vaginal delivery, she would have proceeded differently 
(factual causation established) and her son would have avoided injury (the risk that 
materialised could have been avoided). 
Chester has been overused in situations where it simply does not fit or apply.78 Care 
must be taken to ensure that Chester is not raised in argument by the claimant to 
make the causation analysis in any new case more complicated than it needs to be. 
The claimant cannot simply invoke it whenever a causation challenge is anticipated 
as Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust 79 will show.  
Duce v Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust– back where we started? 
Like Chester, Duce80 was a surgical consent case and the surgery was performed 
competently. Unfortunately, the claimant suffered chronic post-surgical pain and 
alleged that the defendant had failed to warn her of this possible outcome. The trial 
judge found that, applying Montgomery, there was no duty to warn the claimant of 
the risk of chronic or neuropathic pain and in any event, the claimant had been 
warned of the risk pain although the words ‘chronic’ or ‘neuropathic’ had not been 
specifically used. Additionally, the claimant was informed of an alternative treatment. 
At first instance, the court determined that the claimant would still have proceeded 
                                                          
78 Supra n 3. In Shaw v Kovac and University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 1028.  LJ Davis 
in his judgment noted causation was established, thus there was no need to invoke Chester.  In Correia v 
University Hospital of North Staffordshire NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 356 the claimant argued that the failure to 
warn her of the risks meant she did not need to establish causation in the traditional sense. It was sufficient to 
show the injury was within the scope of the surgeon’s duty to warn. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed 
the argument. There was no evidence to justify a complaint against the consent procedure in this case. The 
claimant unlike Carole Chester had never argued that, had she been so warned, she would have deferred it or 
gone to another surgeon. 
79 Supra n 3 
80 Supra n 3 at [51] 
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with the operation immediately regardless of whether or not she was warned of the 
risk of pain. 
The claimant appealed on several grounds though our focus is causation. The 
claimant contended that in risk disclosure cases, legal causation is established by 
satisfying the following test: 
(i) The injury suffered was intimately involved with the duty to warn and the 
duty was owed by the doctor who performed the surgery on the patient; 
and 
(ii) The injury was the product of the very risk that the patient should have 
warned about when they gave their consent.81 
 
The claimant, relying on Chester argued that damages should be awarded in any 
situation where there is a duty to warn of a risk, the patient is not warned and the risk 
materialised. In other words, a denial of the patient’s right to make an informed choice 
gives rise to a right to compensation. This claimant also implied that the Chester 
exception applied to both factual and legal causation. Previously, the trial judge had 
dismissed the claimant’s argument on factual causation and found that she even if a 
warning had been given she would have proceeded with surgery on the same day.82 
Relying on Lord Hope’s judgment in Chester the claimant contended that there was 
no need to establish factual causation.83 By any stretch of the imagination this was an 
incorrect interpretation of Chester. In Chester, the House of Lords found the but for 
test was clearly satisfied.84 Chester is not an authority to dispense with factual 
causation. This is not the ratio in Chester. Chester’s importance is with regard to legal 
causation only.  Lord Justice Hamblen seized the opportunity to confirm the ratio in 
Chester. Fifteen years on from Chester, his words have a resonance that is long 
overdue. Perhaps, at last he has put the genie back in the bottle. First he poured cold 
water on the notion of a free-standing test, Lord Hope in Chester had merely set out 
‘the circumstances which justify the normal approach to causation being modified’ 
nothing more. 85 Secondly, he explained that the modification in Chester was simply 
                                                          
81 Ibid. 
82 Referred to by the Court of Appeal at [28]. 
83 Supra  n 3 at [50]. 
84 Supra  n 1 at [7], [19] and [81]. 
85 Supra, n 3 at [84]. 
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‘to treat a “but for” cause that was not an effective cause as a sufficient cause in law 
in the “unusual” circumstances of the case’.86 In other words, although Carole Chester 
could establish that the failure to disclose the risk denied her chance to avoid the risk, 
she could not establish that she would have acted differently, she may have still 
elected to run the risk if properly informed and suffered the resultant injury. 
Chester is fact specific, there is no general exception and fundamentally, 
 ‘the majority decision in Chester does not negate the requirement for a claimant to 
demonstrate a “but for” causative effect of the breach of duty, as that requirement was 
interpreted by the majority, and specifically that the operation would have not have 
taken place when it did.’ 87 
Chester was never an authority that, in consent cases, factual causation can be 
dispensed with. Therefore, Chester was of no help to the claimant in Duce, since the 
trial judge had previously determined that, even with additional advice, the same 
surgery would always have taken place when it did. 
The Chester exception is viable only when a claimant proves that with full disclosure 
of the risk, she would have delayed the treatment to a later time, with an identical risk 
of harm. 88Duce confirms that if she would have had the treatment at the same time, 
the claim fails. If she would never have had the treatment at all then on the 
conventional but for approach the claim succeeds; there is no recourse to Chester. 
Chester is an ordinary case which has now run out of steam in relation to factual 
causation. Duce stands as the final nail in its coffin. Chester is and never was an 
alternative to the factual causation test.  Rather, it is an example of the very application 
of it. Its significance (if any) lies at the legal causation stage.  If a claimant falls at the 
factual causation stage, Chester cannot come to the rescue.  
                                                          
86 Ibid at [66]. 
87 Ibid at [69]. 
88 Crossman v St George’s Healthcare NHST [2016] EWHC 2878 is case in point although the case succeeded 
using conventional causation principles. At [53] the trial judge stressed that ‘it is important to keep in mind the 
exceptional and limited nature of the extension to conventional causation principles that the majority in the House 
of Lords intended to make in Chester v Afshar.’ 
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In the final part of this article, we summarise the arguments on the applicability of the 
Chester exception that can now be laid to rest and the issues that remain 
outstanding.   
 
Factual causation: a settled outlook but with clouds on the horizon 
Have we finally achieved clarity regarding factual causation in the aftermath of 
Chester? 
Chester had been wrongly labelled as a radical case which took an unconventional 
approach to factual causation.89 This misunderstanding may be, at least in part, 
attributable to the reference to Fairchild 90 in the House of Lords when in fact no such 
recourse to policy was required at the factual causation stage. In clinical negligence 
cases the factual causation stage has consistently been a necessary and accessible 
filter to identify factors which lack the necessary causal connection. In other areas of 
tort, the courts can and have invoked policy at the factual causation stage but only 
where there are multiple potential causal factors in play. 91 In clinical negligence 
however we witness a much more restrictive, more orthodox approach.92 It would be 
surprising if steps were taken in future risk disclosure cases to provide a solution to 
problematic factual causation situations that would represent a wholesale rejection of 
the principles of factual causation.93  Chester certainly would not provide authority to 
do so; the but for test was satisfied.  
                                                          
89 See for example R Stevens, ‘An Opportunity to Reflect’ (2005) 121 LQR 189; S Green, ‘Coherence of Medical 
Negligence Cases: A Game of Doctors and Purses’ (2006) 14 Med L Rev 1; and K Zoltan von CsefalvayBartal, 
‘On Good Intentions and Poor Outcomes: A Critical Retrospective on Chester v Afshar’ (2009) 9 UCD L Rev 46.  
90 Supra n 20 
91 Ibid 
92 In Wilsher v Essex Area. Health. Authority [1988] A.C. 1074 a baby had been negligently given excess oxygen. 
The baby developed retrolental fibroplasia which led to near total blindness. The negligence however was only 
one of five possible causes. The House of Lords declined to apply the ‘materially increased the risk’ test from 
McGhee, (supra n 20) Lord Bridge at [1090] stating that McGhee had simply taken ‘a robust and pragmatic 
approach to the undisputed primary facts.’  
93 In relation to clinical negligence we see a robust, orthodox approach regarding factual causation. For instance, 
in Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2.The House of Lords took a rigid approach notwithstanding the apparent 
unfairness of this for the claimant. The delay in referring the Mr Gregg to hospital resulted in a reduction of his 
chance of survival (falling from 42% to 25%). His claim failed on the basis that at the time of the breach his 
prospect of survival was already less than 50% In dismissing the claimant’s appeal Lord Hoffman at [79] held 
‘There is no inherent uncertainty about what caused something to happen in the past or about whether something 
which happened in the past will cause something to happen in the future.  Everything is determined by causality.  
What we lack is knowledge and the law deals with lack of knowledge by the concept of the burden of proof.’ 
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The position regarding factual causation appears to be settled. Thus the 
‘acquiescent patient’ who would have still taken the same path had they been told of 
the risks will fail to satisfy the but for test and the case of Duce94 is unequivocal; the 
ratio of Chester provides no alternative solution for the patient. 
The ‘unsure patient’ who simply says ‘I don’t know what I would have done’ may 
pose greater problems in determining causation, but this is still addressed on a 
conventional basis. Let us suppose that a doctor was in breach of the duty of care 
owed to a patient due to failure to disclose an important risk associated with complex 
spinal surgery. At the time of the surgery the patient was suffering from severe 
depression and it was only once the depression had alleviated the patient decided to 
pursue a claim. Now the patient finds it genuinely difficult to provide evidence as to 
what they would have decided at the time of the surgery. After recovering from 
depression the patient finds it difficult to return to that frame of mind and contemplate 
what decision would have been made. It is still possible for external evidence to be 
adduced to establish causation.95 Indeed, in relation to the causation issue in 
Montgomery, the claimant benefited from the doctor’s evidence which indicated that 
it was likely that a patient would opt for a caesarean section where risks associated 
with natural delivery were explained.96 This is not evidence of ‘manipulating’ 
causation or invocation of policy, it is simply an alternative way to establish causation 
on the balance of probabilities by relying on evidence other than the claimant’s own 
assertion of what the likely decision would have been. 
So does this mean factual causation is finally settled? Perhaps there is one further 
issue to address. 
The particular patient: an alternative approach to the evidential standard is 
required post-Montgomery 
Could we see Montgomery, a pioneering case in respect of breach of duty, as the 
new platform for a fresh approach to the evidential standard applied to causation 
arguments? We argue it has the potential to shake up the aspect of causation that 
had until now been relatively settled, namely how we test the claimant’s evidence 
                                                          
94 Supra  n 3 
95 See for example McAllister v Lewisham and North Southwark Health Authority [1994] 5 Med. L.R. 343. Rougier 
J at [353] confirmed ‘The fact that the plaintiff herself…is reluctant to hypothesise, should not of itself preclude a 
judge from the attempt, provided there exists sufficient material upon which he can properly act.’ 
96 Supra  n 9 
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they would have changed their behaviour if they had known of the unexplained risk 
or alternative procedure. 
 
The court must determine factual causation using a subjective test to decide whether 
or not this patient would have agreed to treatment if the relevant risk or alternative 
procedure had been explained.97 Factual causation has turned on whether the trial 
judge believed the claimant’s evidence that treatment would have been declined. As 
we have seen in Smith there is an objective element to this assessment, what would 
the reasonable person in the claimant’s position have done had the risk been 
disclosed?98 If it appears the reasonable person would have agreed to the procedure 
in any event, then the court will consider whether there are ‘extraneous or additional 
factors’ to support the claimant’s assertion that treatment would have been refused.99  
 
In the post Montgomery era of patient autonomy is an alternative approach needed? 
In the recent decision of Diamond v Royal Devon & Exeter NHS Foundation Trust100 
the Court of Appeal considered the appellant’s argument that the trial judge had 
taken the wrong approach at the causation stage when determining how she would 
have behaved had she been aware of the risks associated with the planned 
procedure. 
 
In Diamond, a patient required a hernia repair.101 Freedman J found that the risks 
associated with mesh repair (should the claimant become pregnant) and an 
alternative to mesh repair (albeit with a higher risk of failure) should have been 
explained to the claimant.   
 
The claimant argued she would not have had the mesh repair if she had been told of 
the risks. Despite finding the claimant to be ‘a credible and truthful witness’ 
Freedman J decided that she would still have agreed to the mesh repair even if the 
                                                          
97 Supra n 29. 
98 Supra  n 30 at [289]. In Smith, Hutchinson J referred to ‘the importance of giving proper weight to an objective 
assessment of what a reasonable patient could be expected to decide in the light of such proper advice as should 
have been given.’ 
99 Ibid. 
100 Supra  n 3. 
101 The claimant had undergone spinal fusion surgery. Subsequently she was diagnosed with a post-operative 
incisional hernia. Surgery was performed to repair the hernia using an open mesh-based repair. The claimant 
contended that she should have been informed of the adverse risks associated with mesh repair, (the mesh could 
restrict the growth of the uterus and there could be post pregnancy complications) should she become pregnant.  
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information regarding risks and alternatives had been provided.102  Although 
acknowledging the claimant ‘genuinely believes and has convinced herself’ that she 
would have opted for the alternative treatment, the judge noted that ‘it does not of 
course, automatically follow that what she now believes to be the case would in fact 
have been the position at the material time’. 103 The claimant appealed and 
challenged the trial judge’s approach to the causation issue. 
 
The Court of Appeal rightly noted that the but for test determines factual causation 
and, ‘it is for the patient to prove that had he or she been warned of the risks, the 
patient would not have consented to treatment.’104 The trial judge correctly identified  
that: ‘The critical question is of course what the Claimant would have elected to do 
armed with the knowledge that a mesh repair carried certain risks in the event of a 
pregnancy and that a suture repair was a possibility, albeit likely to fail’.105 The 
appellant accepted this was the issue to be addressed, but questioned the trial 
judge’s approach in determining the answer.  
 
The appellant argued that post Chester and Montgomery she had the ‘choice to 
make decisions that others, including the court, might regard as unwise, irrational or 
harmful to their own interests’.106 The trial judge had decided opting for suture repair 
would have been irrational, that the appellant was not a person who would act 
irrationally and consequently she would have agreed to the mesh repair in any event. 
She therefore argued the trial judge had erred by applying ‘a rationality approach, 
which represents the hypothetical rational person rather than the real person before 
the court’ and that ‘the judge’s assessment of rationality is not a reliable basis to infer 
what she would have done’.107 Lady Justice Davies however disagreed and 
considered the trial judge’s approach had been ‘detailed, nuanced and insightful’ and 
that a Montgomery-compliant approach had been adopted as ‘he took account of the 
reasonable person in the patient’s position but also gave weight to the characteristics 
of the appellant herself.’ 108 
                                                          
102 Ibid at [45]. 
103 Ibid at [47]. 
104 Ibid  at [15]. 
105 Ibid per Freedman J, referred to by the Court of Appeal at [9] 
106 Ibid  at [13]. 
107 Ibid at [19]. 
108 Ibid at [22]. 
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On the facts of this particular case this may well have been the appropriate causal 
enquiry, i.e. where the breach can be established because the reasonable person in 
the patient’s position would have wanted the information, then it may be acceptable 
for the causation test to be similarly aligned.  We can question though whether giving 
‘weight to the characteristics of the appellant herself’109 will always suffice. Will there 
be occasions which demand an exclusively subjective approach without reference to 
the reasonable person? 
 
When considering the ‘test of materiality’ Davies LJ states ‘I understand that test to 
mean that in considering what a reasonable person in the patient’s position would 
attach significance to, account must be taken of the particular patient.’110 Yet this 
comment appears to result in a fusion of the reasonable person in the patient’s 
position and the particular patient, in stark contrast Montgomery identified the two 
‘patients’ as distinct personalities.111 
  
In the Montgomery judgment the notion of the particular patient, patient (X) appears 
as an alternate route to establish breach of duty where breach may not be 
established on a ‘reasonable patient’ basis . There may be something unique about 
X, which obliges a doctor to disclose information about risks that may have not been 
provided to the reasonable patient (Y). Montgomery confirmed a risk was material 
and should be disclosed where: 
 
‘a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to 
the risk or [emphasis added] the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.112’ 
 
This alternative identified in the Montgomery test is important. It is inherent in 
Montgomery there is an understanding the particular patient may have wanted 
                                                          
109 Ibid at [22] 
110 Ibid at [20] 
111 Supra  n 2 at [49] 
112 Ibid  
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information a reasonable person in the patient’s position would not. This crucial 
distinction is not made clear by the Court of Appeal in Diamond. 
 
Following Montgomery, if the doctor does not comply with the duty and disclose the 
material risk that patient X would want to know then the court still need to assess 
how patient X would have behaved had they been provided with the information. 
Patient X must establish the causal link between the failure to warn and the damage 
sustained. Bear in mind the hypothetical reasonable person in the patient’s position 
(reasonable patient Y) may well have not been entitled to the information in the first 
place because it would not have been significant to them; it is patient X’s special 
status as the particular patient which resulted in the need for disclosure.  
 
The but for test should be constructed accordingly and a purely subjective approach 
should be taken when ‘testing’ the claimant’s evidence to determine what would the 
particular patient X have done on the balance of probabilities? There is an inherent 
risk of self-serving evidence, but it is the function of the court to test and evaluate 
this evidence. Indeed, particular patient X’s evidence is more likely to be convincing 
if there was something unique about them that meant information should have been 
disclosed on a particular patient basis because it was clearly important to patient X.  
If it is so important, it is more likely than not patient X would have acted on it. The 
particular patient in Montgomery is not the objectively reasonable patient, so why 
should the evidence of particular patient X be tested against the ‘reasonable patient’ 
at causation? Where breach is established on a particular patient basis (where it 
could not be established on a reasonable patient basis) surely it is counterintuitive to 
revert to the objective reasonable patient standard at the causation stage to ‘test’ the 
particular patient’s evidence. If the information is important to patient X then, patient 
X is entitled to have it and should be entitled to do with it whatever patient X wants. 
 
Critics who advocate the status quo should be maintained may argue that removal of 
the need to at least initially consider the claimant’s evidence against the objective 
‘reasonable patient’, would eliminate a key method to assess credibility and result in 
simple acceptance of self-serving evidence.  Yet the claimant’s evidence can be 
tested without the objective ‘reasonable patient’ comparator.  Evidence of 
consistency in approach and whether past decision-making was indicative of a likely 
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cautious approach would be considered.  Indeed such evidence may already have 
been adduced in relation to breach, as if a patient had behaved very cautiously in the 
past this would be a factor raised in evidence to establish that this particular patient 
would have wanted information on this occasion. 
 
Critics may also point out that the additional subjective element when testing the 
claimant’s evidence should allay any concerns regarding the initial objective test.  If 
the reasonable patient would have agreed to the procedure the court will then 
consider ‘extraneous or additional factors’113 factors or, as stated by the Court of 
Appeal in Diamond, the court will give ‘weight to the characteristics’ of the patient to 
test the patient’s assertion they would have refused.114 However, it can be argued 
that the subjective approach should be the primary consideration and not simply be 
employed as a possible rescue bid when the claimant potentially falls at the objective 
hurdle.  It would be helpful if there was clarity as to what ‘weight’ will be given to the 
patient’s characteristics, as they should surely dominate the assessment in relation 
to this causation issue where we are considering the particular patient. 
 
In the wake of Montgomery, we cannot allow the particular patient the information 
they seek then expect them to behave as a reasonable person with that information 
and question their evidence where they insist they would have reached a different 
decision compared to the reasonable person armed with that information.  For 
example, a risk averse patient may have chosen to avoid the risk the reasonable 
person in the claimant’s position would have willingly taken.  To impose an 
inappropriate hurdle when testing the claimant’s evidence at the causation would 
then make the Montgomery obligations regarding risk disclosure the ‘hollow duty’ the 
House of Lords in Chester115 were so keen to avoid.  
 
The courts, in their assessment of the evidence have previously considered 
extraneous factors in assessing how the claimant would have acted had they been 
aware of the risks.  In Webster v Burton Hospitals NHSFT,116 a case factually similar 
                                                          
113 Supra  n 30. 
114 Supra n 108. 
115 Supra n 1 at [87] 
116 [2017] EWCA Civ 62. Sebastian Webster was born with cerebral palsy. It was accepted that his injuries would 
have been avoided if he had been delivered earlier. On appeal the court held that the claimant would elected for 
a caesarean section had she been informed of the risks. Simon Brown LJ relied on the fact that the claimant had 
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to Montgomery the evidence clearly indicated that the claimant would have opted for 
an induction of her labour if she had been aware of the risks of continuing with her 
pregnancy beyond her due date. Simon LJ referred to the findings of Inglis J at first 
instance who opined, 
‘I think that had the mother been advised that she should proceed to induction or that 
there were increased risks in waiting until 6 or 7 January, she would have wanted to 
be delivered. I think she was fed up with the pregnancy and with the lack of well-
being and it was the due date that she had in mind. She would not have wanted it to 
be put off, since the prospect of induction was looming in any event’.117 
 
Webster is an example of a reasonable patient, a patient shown from previous 
actions unwilling to run an unnecessary risk. In Less v Hussain the High Court found 
that although the defendant had breached her duty of care in failing to advise the 
claimant of the risks of a further pregnancy, the claimant would have still have fallen 
pregnant even if properly advised.118 Cotter J noted the claimant was a ‘stoic and 
strong willed individual’.119 She had embarked on a second pregnancy in spite of her 
suffering from severe morning sickness during her first pregnancy and she had 
seriously contemplated a further pregnancy following a stillbirth. Post-Montgomery  
Less should perhaps now be viewed as an example of the ‘particular patient’,120  a 
claimant who is resolute, unwavering in her approach, perhaps coming to a decision, 
which ‘no one in their right mind’ would have made. In Jones v North West SHA,121 
the claimant, like Nadine Montgomery, also alleged that if she had been made aware 
of the risk of shoulder dystocia she would have not have proceeded with a vaginal 
delivery for the birth of her son. The claimant’s religious convictions however were 
sufficient for the court to find that she would not have elected for a caesarean section 
had the risks been disclosed.122 The court noted that in 1992 for the claimant to have 
                                                          
a degree in nursing, that previously she had demonstrated a willingness to take responsibility for her pregnancy 
and in her evidence she had expressly stated that if there had been ‘any suggestion of risk I would have wanted 
him delivered.’ 
117 Ibid at [20]. 
118 [2012] EWHC 3513 
119 Ibid at [141]. 
120 Ibid at [141], [149] and [150]. At [153] Cotter J opined that “even if the consultant had, after properly setting 
out the risks, sought to actively discourage Ms Less from trying to conceive with the reasoning advanced that she 
already had been blessed with two children, that this would not have stopped her.” 
 
121 [2010] EWHC 178 
122 Ibid at [66]. Her evidence indicated that the claimant had an antipathy to her newly born son receiving blood 
products. Although she argued that she was a non-practising Jehovah’s Witness, the court found she would not 
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elected for a caesarean section “would mean that she was one of those unusual 
patients who would not have followed her doctor's advice as to the manner in which 
she should give birth’.123 With the advent of Montgomery, Mrs Jones would not now 
be labelled unusual, but simply an example of a particular patient.  We are now done 
with the patient who is categorised as ’mainstream.’ 124 
 
Webster, Less and Jones are three instances of the courts drawing on the evidence 
of past behaviour of a claimant and then assessing what route each would have 
followed had they been fully informed of the risks. If the courts can do this, then the 
courts can also evaluate if our particular patient X would have deviated from what 
the reasonable patient Y would have done and that X’s course of conduct was 
reasonable and nothing more than expected. 
 
 
Legal causation: Pushing boundaries and storms brewing  
Causation consists of two stages, factual causation and legal causation. Our 
attention here has largely concentrated on factual causation arguments. The Chester 
exception, however applies only at the legal causation stage.  We close with a brief 
deliberation on the possible development of legal causation arguments in light of 
this: 
Although Chester does indeed offer some flexibility in relation to legal causation this 
should cause less disquiet in the light of the inherent policy dimension of the legal 
causation stage. The risk she should have been warned about was the very risk 
which materialised. The approach taken in Chester is not entirely inconsistent with 
the normal application of remoteness and policy.  We can envisage situations where 
it would have been a step too far for remoteness to succeed and legal causation 
would have been rejected on an entirely conventional basis.125 Perhaps Chester 
                                                          
have consented to a caesarean procedure with “its added risk of bleeding and the possible need for a 
transfusion.”   
123 Ibid at [67]. The claimant had stated in evidence that, “she put her trust in the doctor. They did lots of 
caesareans.’ 
124 ibid at [66]. 
125 Supra  n 47 at [43]. Consider, for instance the examples given by the Court of Appeal in Chester v Afshar at 
[43], ‘the defendant is not liable for coincidences which have nothing to do with him, such as the anaesthetic 
failure referred to by Gummow J or lightning striking the operating theatre’. 
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offers limited scope for application into other remoteness conundrums when in 
unfamiliar territory. 
In terms of application of Chester, we do not yet seem to have encountered a case 
which has benefited from its possible legal causation flexibility (once factual 
causation has been established).  
 
Materialisation of an unrelated risk 
What if there was a materialisation of a different risk? What if a patient X established 
that her doctor was negligent for failing to warn her of a risk of a complication 
associated with the medication she was taking? Fortunately for patient X the said 
risk does not materialise but unfortunately she suffers injury due to a different risk, a 
risk which the doctor is not negligent for failing to disclose. Knowledge of the risk that 
her doctor should have disclosed would have made no difference to patient X; she 
will still suffer injury due to a different risk.  
Her claim will fail. In Chester it was made clear that it was significant it was the risk 
she should have been warned about which materialised.   
Special consideration for a closely connected risk: application of policy and a 
potential storm brewing 
We can perhaps gain an insight as to how the court might approach this from the 
wrongful birth case Khan v  Meadows.126 The claimant had consulted her GP as she 
was concerned that she may be a carrier of haemophilia. Blood tests were 
performed however, those tests could only detect whether the claimant herself had 
haemophilia, and not if she was a carrier. Falsely reassured that the results of the 
tests were normal and that any child she conceived would be free from haemophilia, 
the claimant became pregnant and gave birth to a son, Adejuwon, who was 
diagnosed as having haemophilia. If the claimant had known that she was a carrier 
of haemophilia before she became pregnant, she would have undergone foetal 
testing, which would have revealed her foetus was affected, and she would have 
terminated her pregnancy. Therefore, but for the negligence, Adejuwon would never 
                                                          
126 [2019] EWCA Civ 152 
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have been born. Adejuwon had also developed autism which was unrelated to his 
haemophilia. The claimant sought damages in relation to his haemophilia and 
autism. The defendant admitted negligence in failing to warn the claimant of the risk 
of haemophilia however denied she was also liable for the costs associated with 
Adejuwon’s autism.  It was clear but for the defendant’s negligence, Adejuwon would 
not have been born. Factual causation established. However, the defendant’s duty 
was to provide information in relation to the risks of haemophilia only, not the risk of 
autism. Additionally, the defendant’s breach of duty had not increased the risk of 
autism, this risk was inherent. The Court of Appeal held that a mother who consults a 
doctor in order to avoid the birth of a child with one disability could not recover 
damages for the costs associated with a different disability. Distinguishing the 
claimant’s action from Chester Lady Justice Davies observed, 
‘Central to the reasoning in Chester v Afshar was the fact that the misfortune which 
befell the claimant was the very misfortune that the defendant had a duty to warn 
against. A fundamental distinction with the facts of this case... In the context of this 
case, the development of autism was a coincidental injury and not one within the 
scope of the appellant’s duty’.127 
The Appeal Court emphasised that in Chester, policy was invoked because the risk 
which materialised was within the scope of the duty to warn, the risk was caused by 
the breach of that duty and therefore on policy grounds the legal causation test was 
met. In Meadows, the defendant’s duty was to give advice relating to the 
haemophilia, not to give advice generally about the risks of pregnancy or more 
specifically autism. In Chester the injury suffered was the very injury about which the 
surgeon owed a duty to warn. In Meadows there was no duty to warn of the risk of 
autism therefore there was no causal link between the duty and the loss. 
Meadows demonstrates that if the courts should invoke policy at the legal causation 
stage then the claimant’s injury must be intimately connected to the breach, the 
injury must be a consequence of a risk that the claimant would not have accepted 
had she been made aware. This approach is consistent with that taken by the 
Australian High Court decision in Wallace v Kam. 128  In Meadows the general risks 
                                                          
127 Ibid at [30]. 
128 Supra 65. In Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 73 the claimant, like Miss Chester also had a history of back 
pain. He agreed to undergo lumbar fusion surgery which carried with it two inherent risks. The defendant failed to 
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associated with pregnancy and more specifically autism were wholly distinct from the 
risk of haemophilia. In Wallace the risk of nerve damage to the thigh caused by the 
patient needing to lie stationary for a protracted period of time was wholly unrelated 
to the more serious one-in-twenty risk of paralysis. Khan and Wallace perhaps can 
be distinguished on the basis that in Khan the defendant was not under a duty to 
disclose the risk (autism) that materialised; in Wallace the defendant was in breach 
for failing to disclose the lesser risk that materialised and the more serious risk that 
did not occur.129 However, in both cases the two risks were separate and distinct and 
the claimant would have a different response to each risk had they been aware.130 
More significantly, it is evident that there can be no compensation for the 
materialisation of a risk that in all likelihood the claimant would have accepted. 
 
Therefore, will the courts be inclined to apply policy in relation to that associated 
coincidental risk? The definition of what is a coincidental risk and how it affects the 
causal enquiry is problematic.  As Turton notes the notion of coincidence can be 
used to both deny and establish causation.131 There is no better illustration of this 
than Chester itself. In Chester the minority argued the risk remained constant 
whenever the operation took place, it was a mere coincidence that it materialised 
when it did; the majority that the risk that materialised cannot be labelled coincidental 
as it was the very risk of which the claimant should have been warned.132 Clark and 
Nolan argue that what makes a damage non-coincidental in a non-disclosure claim 
negligent is that the risk occurred when the ‘patient was unwilling to subject herself 
                                                          
inform Wallace of either risk and he succumbed to the lesser of the two risks. It was not claimed that the 
operation was performed negligently, the claimant’s case was solely that the negligent failure to disclose the risks 
had caused him injury. Although accepting that the defendant was in breach of his duty to disclose the risk, the 
High Court concluded the claimant had not established causation. Had a warning of the risk which eventuated 
been given, the High Court considered the claimant would have proceeded with the surgery even though he 
would have declined the surgery if he had been made aware of the second more serious risk. The Court 
concluded that the Wallace ‘should not be compensated for the materialisation of a risk he would have been 
prepared to accept.’ See also Carver and Smith, Medical Negligence, Causation and Liability for Non-Disclosure 
of Risk: A Post Wallace Framework and Critique 37 UNSWLJ 972, 1019 (2014) who conclude that ‘Wallace 
reflects a policy choice that, in failure to warn cases, liability ought only to attach to physical injury the risk of 
which was unacceptable to the patient.’  
 
129 However, in both cases it is evident that there can be no compensation for the materialisation of a risk that in 
all likelihood the claimant would have accepted. 
 
130 Khan and Wallace can be distinguished from Moyes v Lothian Health Board [1990] 1 Med LR 463 where the 
claimant was allowed to recover for harm caused due to the materialisation of risks peculiar to the particular 
patient which were not disclosed. In this instance, the risks were cumulative and the claimant would have 
declined treatment had they been aware of the total risk. 
131 Supra  n 26 
132 Supra  n 1 at [9] and [94]. 
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to that risk.’ 133 They contend as Carole Chester was willing to run the risk, (albeit on 
a different day) the injury which befell her was a mere coincidence and the non-
disclosure cannot be regarded as a cause of her injury. Although agreeing with Clark 
and Nolan that the damage in Chester was coincidental Turton argues that the 
correct question is framed in probability, does the ‘non-disclosure affect the degree 
of risk to which the patient is exposed’.134 As Carole Chester would have exposed 
herself to the identical risk on a different day, the materialisation of the risk on any 
particular day is coincidental as it is unaffected by the non-disclosure. 135 How the 
courts approach the coincidental risk will wholly depend on whether the courts depart 
from the general principles of the scope of liability which is, as Turton observes, ‘not 
simply concerned with the vindication of rights.’ 136 Like Turton, we would endorse a 
more mathematical approach to the coincidental risk, was the risk that materialised a 
consequence of the non-disclosure or was it a discrete risk, an occurrence that may 
be more properly labelled independent or unaltered by the failure to warn. The role of 
causation is about the attribution of responsibility nothing more. However, deference 
to patient autonomy resulted in the rejection of the Bolam test in Montgomery. 
Autonomy is now centre stage.  There is perhaps a dawning realisation that the 
courts new commitment to supporting autonomy may lead to unexpected or even 
undesirable outcomes in a departure from traditional causation rules and that 
perhaps in the right circumstances, an exception will be made. What those 
circumstances are remains to be clearly and coherently mapped by the courts. 
 
Conclusion  
Given the increased focus on patient autonomy and the more patient–friendly inquiry 
at the breach of duty stage post-Montgomery it is likely the courts will face more 
causation conundrums.  In relation to factual causation, it appears the furore in the 
aftermath of Chester has abated.  The claimant in Chester was able to satisfy the but 
for test, thus the House of Lords decision cannot provide authority to dispense with 
                                                          
133  Supra  n 25. 
134  Supra  n 26 at [126]. 
135  Ibid. 
136  Ibid at [133]. 
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this test where a claimant struggles with factual causation as confirmed by 
subsequent case law. 
 
The only outstanding issue appears to be how a claimant’s evidence should be 
assessed when determining factual causation.  On this point, it is the case of 
Montgomery rather than Chester which will be significant. Although the but for test 
itself is addressed subjectively, a claimant’s witness evidence is first subjected to an 
objective assessment and compared to what a reasonable patient would decide if 
they had known about the relevant risk.  It is only when it is established that the 
reasonable patient would have agreed to the procedure that the court will then 
consider extraneous factors. Post Montgomery this initial objective assessment to 
assess the claimant’s witness evidence should no longer be the inevitable starting 
point.  Where for instance, the need for disclosure arises due to the characteristics of 
the ‘particular patient’, then such a case would demand an exclusively subjective 
approach and the claimant’s evidence should be tested without reference to the 
objective standard. 
 
With regard to legal causation we have identified two ends of the spectrum of 
liability. Chester presented a relatively easy legal causation challenge. The very risk 
that materialised was the risk that the defendant was in breach of duty for failing to 
disclose. In contrast, in Meadows the risk that occurred was not within the scope of 
the defendant’s duty to warn. The risk of autism was an entirely discrete risk, 
unconnected to the risk of haemophilia and an injury that the courts were not 
prepared to compensate. In the future, we envisage that the courts may be required 
to wrestle with cases that are not as straightforward, facts that fall somewhere within 
these two end points.  
Potentially the English courts may adopt a more stringent approach to legal 
causation now that the breach of duty inquiry is more patient friendly. Much will 
depend however on how the courts view the role of legal causation and what they 
ultimately determine should be the function of legal causation. Should legal 
causation simply be a necessary step for the claimant to establish in proving the 
avoidance of physical harm, the preferred option for example in Wallace or, with the 
focus on patients’ rights post-Montgomery does legal causation have a new role to 
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safeguard such rights, with the protection of autonomy the ultimate trump card? In 
Chester Lord Hope said, 
‘The function of the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies 
when duties have been breached.’ 137 
With respect, we would suggest that is the overall aim of the law but it is not the 
function of legal causation. Legal causation has always been about attributing 
responsibility for harm, connecting the breach to the physical injury and determining 
the scope of liability. Autonomy is a right which requires protection, but that is not the 
purpose of legal causation. There is a real danger in a rights-based approach to 
legal causation which could potentially open Pandora’s box. What other rights could 
be judged deserving of a remedy in the absence of foreseeability of harm? Would we 
simply be replacing disputes about the scope of liability with disagreements over a 
hierarchy of rights?  The new era of patient autonomy is welcome and long overdue 
but we must not forget that only those who are responsible for harm should be 
targeted.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
137 Supra n 1 at [87]. 
